FTMO's audited 2025 accounts contain a number no prop firm has ever had to publish before: CZK 1.0 billion, set aside as the company's own estimate of what it expects to pay its traders in 2026. It had to raise that provision by 92% in a single year, because the payouts it budgeted for 2024 came in 82% higher than it forecast.
That miss, plus CZK 736 million spent on Facebook and X, is most of the reason net profit fell 59% on record revenue.
Our source is the filing itself. Everything below comes from the Výroční zpráva společnosti FTMO s.r.o. za rok 2025 — the full audited annual report for FTMO s.r.o. (IČO 03136752), prepared under Czech accounting standards on 29 June 2026 and audited by Moore Audit CZ s.r.o., which issued an unmodified opinion with one Emphasis of Matter, covered below. Page references are to that document. Where we use a figure that is not in it — the OANDA purchase price, which sits in the parent's separate consolidated accounts — we say so and name the source. The English-language quotes from the founders were reported by TradeInformer and CzechCrunch. Koruna figures are as filed; dollar equivalents use a constant CZK 20.8 = $1 so years compare cleanly, which means they are not historical rates.
Disclosure: some links on this page are affiliate links, including to FTMO. This never affects what we report or how we rate a firm. See our methodology.
First, What This Company Actually Is
This matters before any number means anything, and most coverage has skipped it.
FTMO s.r.o. is not the entity that sells you a challenge. It is the group's platform and IP company. Note 4.16 states that its revenue consists principally of billing other group companies for operating the trading platform, and note 4.20 puts revenue from related parties at CZK 8.86 billion — against total revenue of CZK 8.81 billion. In other words, essentially 100% of this company's turnover is intragroup. The customer-facing entities are separate companies inside the same group, and there are more than sixty of them listed in the filing's appendix, from Quantlane in Prague to the OANDA subsidiaries in Tokyo, Singapore and New York.
So "FTMO's revenue rose 31% to CZK 8.8 billion" is really a transfer-pricing figure that tracks group activity, not a till receipt. What makes the document worth reading anyway is that the trader payout provision sits in this entity — note 3.10 says it books the reserve for expected future customer payments "realised through group companies" — so this is where the payout economics of the whole group become visible. The report on relations (p.37) is also unusually candid for the record: the company "analyses simulated trades executed on the FTMO platform".
Six Years of Revenue Up, Margin Down
| Year | Revenue (CZK) | Net profit (CZK) | Net margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 1.11bn (~$53m) | 722m (~$35m) | 64.8% |
| 2021 | 3.01bn (~$144m) | 1.68bn (~$81m) | 55.9% |
| 2022 | 3.99bn (~$192m) | 1.46bn (~$70m) | 36.7% |
| 2023 | 4.62bn (~$222m) | 1.64bn (~$79m) | 35.4% |
| 2024 | 6.73bn (~$324m) | 1.89bn (~$91m) | 28.0% |
| 2025 | 8.81bn (~$423m) | 782m (~$38m) | 8.9% |
Operating profit fell 42.2% to CZK 1.22 billion; normalised EBITDA was CZK 1.19 billion; the effective tax rate was 21.3%. Volume was never the problem — new registrations rose 39% to 1.40 million, paid orders rose about 50% to 1.27 million, roughly 80% of turnover came from returning customers, and the service now runs in 20 languages across more than 140 countries. Co-founder and CTO Marek Vašíček called 2025 "probably the toughest test" modern prop trading has faced in recent years.
The Payout Number FTMO Had To Nearly Double
This is the most important table in the filing for anyone holding a funded account. It is note 4.10, and it is the provision for payments to customers.
| Provision for customer payments | CZK |
|---|---|
| Balance at 31 December 2024 | 523.3m (~$25m) |
| Utilised during 2025 | 523.3m — the entire reserve |
| Actually paid to traders in 2025 | ~955m (~$46m) |
| Overshoot against the reserve | +82% |
| New provision created for 2026 | 1,002.6m (~$48m) |
| Net charge to operating costs | 479.3m (~$23m) |
Read that top to bottom. FTMO reserved CZK 523 million against payouts on revenue it had already booked. It spent every koruna of it, and then some: actual rewards paid to customers came to roughly CZK 955 million. It then raised the provision to CZK 1,002.6 million, and the CZK 479.3 million difference went through the income statement as an operating cost.
Three things follow that are worth stating plainly.
The reserve is a forecast, and it is FTMO's own. Note 4.10 says the new balance "reflects the current estimate of expected payments to customers in 2026". That is the company telling its auditor, in a document it is legally obliged to file, that it expects to pay traders roughly a billion koruna — about $48 million — during 2026. Prop firms are not usually required to publish a forward payout estimate. This one is.
The company says the estimate can miss again, and explains why. Note 3.13 is unusually frank: the size of future customer payments "depends on market volatility, particularly the future development of commodity prices (precious metals, oil), currency pairs and other underlying assets, as well as other factors such as geopolitical developments", and amounts actually paid in future periods "may differ materially" from the booked provision. The 2024 estimate missed by 82% precisely because 2025's tariff shocks and safe-haven flows were not in the model.
A payout overshoot is not a loss event — it is traders winning. Payouts are a prop firm's cost of goods sold. A reserve that turns out 82% too small is a firm discovering its customers performed materially better than its own risk model assumed. On our arithmetic, the CZK 955 million paid works out at roughly CZK 752 (about $36) per paid order across 1.27 million orders, and equals 10.8% of revenue. FTMO absorbed the difference through its own income statement rather than through anyone's account, and the accounts show no dispute over it.
CZK 2 Million a Day on Facebook and X
The other half of the profit story is note 4.17, the breakdown of services. It contains a line most companies do not disclose separately at all.
| Services (CZK) | 2025 | 2024 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Related-party costs of operating the trading platform | 5,701.9m | 3,769.8m | +51% |
| Facebook, X and other social media | 735.8m | 398.5m | +85% |
| IT services | 267.6m | 112.1m | +139% |
| Advisory and consulting | 46.7m | 62.6m | −25% |
| Rent-related services | 27.3m | 21.7m | +26% |
| Marketing costs and promotion | 16.0m | 27.0m | −41% |
| Entertainment, travel and other | 44.5m | 16.2m | +175% |
| Total services | 6,839.7m | 4,407.9m | +55% |
The social-media line alone is CZK 735.8 million — about $35 million, or on our arithmetic roughly CZK 2.0 million every single day of 2025. It grew 85% while the separate, conventional "marketing costs and promotion" line fell 41% to CZK 16 million. Every crown of increased advertising went into paid social.
Put the two advertising lines together and FTMO spent CZK 751.8 million acquiring customers, up 77% year on year, equal to 8.5% of revenue against 6.3% the year before. Across 1.27 million paid orders that is about CZK 592 (roughly $28) of advertising per paid order, or CZK 537 per new registration.
Two smaller lines are worth a glance. Related-party platform costs — the single biggest expense in the business — rose from 56.0% to 64.8% of revenue, which is where the gross margin actually went. And headcount doubled from 52 to 102 (note 4.15) with wages up 83% to CZK 205.1 million, so revenue per employee fell from CZK 129.5 million to CZK 86.3 million.
The Three Lines That Ate the Profit
Net profit fell CZK 1,105.7 million. Three swings account for more than all of it, with gains elsewhere partly offsetting. This bridge is ours, built from the filed profit and loss account.
| Swing | 2024 | 2025 | Movement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provision for customer payments | −7.1m (release) | +479.6m (charge) | 486.7m |
| Financial result (FX, trading, bank fees, interest) | +157.6m | −229.2m | 386.8m |
| Facebook, X and social advertising | 398.5m | 735.8m | 337.3m |
| Combined | 1,210.7m | ||
| Actual fall in net profit | 1,888.1m | 782.3m | 1,105.7m |
The financial result deserves a note because it is almost entirely outside the firm's control. Note 4.19 shows FX gains of CZK 125.4 million against FX losses of CZK 319.2 million in 2025 — a net loss of CZK 193.8 million, where 2024 produced a net gain of CZK 131.6 million. That alone is a CZK 325.4 million adverse swing on a business that books in dollars and euros and reports in koruna. Add CZK 72.3 million of bank fees on the OANDA acquisition loan and CZK 38.4 million of interest on debt that did not exist a year earlier, and the whole financial line moves CZK 386.8 million.
The Auditor's One Flag: Equity Went Negative
FTMO s.r.o. ended 2025 with negative equity of CZK 122.6 million, against positive CZK 1,397.5 million a year earlier. It did not trade its way there.
Note 4.9 records that on 18 November 2025 the sole shareholder was paid an advance distribution of profit of CZK 1,048.0 million — and the filing states directly that this advance "exceeded the result for 2025, which is reported in these financial statements at CZK 782.3 million". The shareholder plans, after the accounts are approved, to propose how the CZK 265.7 million overpayment is returned to the company. Separately, CZK 1,270.0 million of the 2024 profit was distributed during the year, so the cash flow statement shows CZK 2,760.5 million of dividends actually paid in 2025.
Moore Audit CZ added an Emphasis of Matter paragraph pointing at exactly this, and closed it with the sentence that matters: "Our opinion is not modified in this respect." The audit opinion is clean, the going-concern assumption is not questioned, and no material subsequent events are reported. Negative equity here is the arithmetic of an over-large dividend to a parent, not a solvency signal — but it is the kind of thing worth knowing exists.
What OANDA Did to the Balance Sheet
The acquisition closed on 1 December 2025, and this filing shows what financing it did to the operating company.
| Item (note) | 31 Dec 2025 | 31 Dec 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Total assets | 6,934.3m | 3,516.0m |
| Cash | 621.3m | 2,522.2m |
| Debt to credit institutions (4.21) | 4,895.0m | nil |
| Intragroup loan made for the OANDA purchase (4.20) | 5,188.3m | nil |
| Equity | −122.6m | 1,397.5m |
FTMO s.r.o. is the borrower under a term facility of up to USD 250 million from a bank club led by UniCredit, drawn on 24 November 2025, and it on-lent CZK 5,188.3 million within the group to buy OANDA. Cash fell 75%, from CZK 2.52 billion to CZK 621.3 million, while total assets nearly doubled.
The security package (note 4.11) is the detail worth pausing on. Under a pledge agreement dated 15 November 2024, the group granted UniCredit security covering secured debts arising over eleven years up to USD 625 million, and FTMO s.r.o. pledged its business, its intellectual property including trademarks and domains, its bank account receivables and its intragroup loan receivables. The parent pledged its entire shareholding in FTMO s.r.o., and cannot grant further security or sell the stake without UniCredit's written consent.
The purchase price is not in this document. It sits in the parent's separate consolidated accounts, which CzechCrunch reported as just under CZK 8.8 billion for 100% of Plutus Investment Holdings — of which CZK 2.74 billion was net assets and CZK 6.06 billion goodwill, amortised over twenty years. On our arithmetic that is roughly CZK 300 million a year of non-cash charge against the group's reported profit into the mid-2040s. We covered the price when it surfaced, in what FTMO's $422 million OANDA purchase means for prop traders.
One coincidence to defuse, because it has confused several write-ups: that price converts to about $422 million, and 2025 revenue of CZK 8.81 billion converts to about $423 million. They are two different facts that land on the same number. FTMO paid roughly one year of revenue for the broker.
How is it going? Co-founder and CEO Otakar Šuffner has said OANDA's performance is "not entirely ideal" from FTMO's perspective, that changes have been made including to management, and that he and Vašíček now steer the broker as co-CEOs — while adding that expectations for the acquisition remain "extremely high".
What This Does and Does Not Mean for Traders
| Reading | Supported by the filing? |
|---|---|
| "Traders are getting paid" | Yes. ~CZK 955m paid in 2025, 82% above reserve, with CZK 1,002.6m now provisioned for 2026. No dispute recorded. |
| "FTMO is in financial trouble" | No. Unmodified audit opinion, going concern not questioned, record revenue, normalised EBITDA CZK 1.19bn, a USD 250m bank facility, and a 1-Step Challenge launched in February 2026. |
| "Negative equity is a red flag" | Not as it stands. It is the result of an advance dividend that exceeded the year's profit and is due to be partly returned. The auditor flagged it and did not modify its opinion. |
| "Margin pressure is real and industry-wide" | Yes. 64.8% to 8.9% net margin in five years, with payouts, advertising and FX all pushing the same way at the sector's largest firm. |
| "Rules will get harder" | Not shown. Nothing in the filing says so, and we have logged no matching FTMO rule change. It is the thing to watch, not a thing that has happened. |
The practical follow-through is unglamorous: margin pressure at a prop firm shows up in the rulebook before it shows up anywhere a trader can see it. Payout frequency, consistency rules, drawdown definitions and news-trading restrictions are all levers that move that CZK 1 billion provision. We crawl those pages daily and publish the diffs on the Capital Critic changelog, so if FTMO's terms move, the before-and-after wording will be there. You can also compare what firms commit to on the prop firm comparison table, and see the payouts we verify independently on the on-chain payout tracker — FTMO does not settle through the wallets we track, so it does not appear there.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much does FTMO actually pay its traders?
Roughly CZK 955 million (about $46 million) during 2025, according to note 4.10 of the audited accounts of FTMO s.r.o. That is about 10.8% of the company's revenue, or roughly CZK 752 per paid order across 1.27 million orders. The company has provisioned CZK 1,002.6 million for expected customer payments in 2026.
Why did FTMO's profit fall 59%?
Three swings account for more than the whole fall. The provision for customer payments moved CZK 486.7 million against the company, because 2024's payouts came in 82% above the reserve. The financial result moved CZK 386.8 million, driven by a CZK 325.4 million adverse currency swing plus bank fees and interest on the new OANDA loan. And spending on Facebook, X and other social media rose CZK 337.3 million. Together that is CZK 1,210.7 million against an actual profit fall of CZK 1,105.7 million.
How much does FTMO spend on advertising?
CZK 735.8 million on Facebook, X and other social media in 2025, up 85%, plus CZK 16.0 million on conventional marketing and promotion, which fell 41%. Combined that is CZK 751.8 million, 8.5% of revenue, or roughly CZK 2.0 million a day. It works out at about CZK 592 of advertising per paid order.
Did FTMO lose money in 2025?
No. FTMO s.r.o. was profitable: net profit of CZK 782.3 million (about $38 million) on record revenue of CZK 8.81 billion, an 8.9% net margin, with operating profit of CZK 1.22 billion. A sharply lower profit is not a loss.
Why is FTMO s.r.o.'s equity negative?
Because on 18 November 2025 it paid its sole shareholder an advance profit distribution of CZK 1,048.0 million, which exceeded the CZK 782.3 million it earned that year, leaving equity at −CZK 122.6 million. The shareholder is due to propose how the CZK 265.7 million overpayment is returned. The auditor added an Emphasis of Matter about it and explicitly did not modify its opinion.
Does any of this mean FTMO is unsafe to trade with?
Nothing in the filing suggests that. The audit opinion is unmodified, going concern is not questioned, no material events occurred after the balance sheet date, revenue is at a record and the group drew a USD 250 million facility from a bank club led by UniCredit. The payout overshoot is evidence of traders being paid, not of payments being missed. Thin margin and inability to pay are different things.
Whose accounts are these, exactly?
FTMO s.r.o., IČO 03136752, the group's platform and IP company, whose sole shareholder is OMHC a.s. (renamed from FTMO Holding a.s. in January 2025). Essentially all of its revenue is billing to other group companies, so these are not consolidated group figures — the consolidated statements are a separate document filed by OMHC. The trader payout provision sits in this entity, which is why it is the useful one to read.
How much did FTMO pay for OANDA?
Just under CZK 8.8 billion, about $422 million, for 100% of Plutus Investment Holdings — a figure from the parent's consolidated accounts, not from this filing, and undisclosed when the deal closed on 1 December 2025. What this filing shows is the financing: a USD 250 million facility led by UniCredit drawn on 24 November 2025, CZK 4,895.0 million of bank debt where there was none, a CZK 5,188.3 million intragroup loan, and security over the business, its trademarks and its domains.
What We Are Watching Next
One number decides how this story reads in a year: whether CZK 1,002.6 million turns out to be enough. FTMO has now been wrong about its payout provision once, by 82%, and its own accounting policy warns that the next estimate can miss materially too. That provision is the cleanest published read anywhere on whether prop firm risk models have caught up with how funded traders actually behave in volatile markets — and unlike almost everything else in this industry, it will be audited and filed again next June.
The second is OANDA, bought for roughly a year of revenue, financed against the group's own trademarks, and described by its new owners as underperforming.
Neither is visible from a challenge dashboard. The rulebook is, and that is what we track. For the firm itself, see the FTMO profile and its current offer, our comparison of FTMO alternatives, and the running log of prop firm rule changes in 2026.
Capital Critic reads prop firm filings and crawls prop firm rule pages so traders do not have to. Every entry on the changelog is a human-reviewed diff of the firm's own page, with the old and new text side by side.
